In this chapter, we attempt to follow the logic of the predatory state as it has operated in Haiti for more than a century and a half. Thereafter, we point to some of its main consequences, notably the separation of the majority of the population from the decision-making bodies and the macroeconomic morass bequeathed by the government of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986. Finally, we provide a brief account of what has taken place since that date, underscoring various reform efforts and setbacks, and discuss the prospects for future economic reform.
A model of the predatory state
The Haitian rulers of the past focused most of their efforts on obtaining private incomes through control of the government machinery. Essentially, they may be pictured as possessing a utility function with two arguments: one is income and the other is the probability of remaining in power.
3 In order to achieve these two objectives, they had to make two types of decisions: how many accomplices to cut in on a given deal and how to go about securing their prey, either overtly or covertly.
Formally, the ruler then maximizes a utility function
where Y is ruler income and P the probability of the ruler remaining in power. Utility is increasing in both arguments, but at a decreasing rate. Income, in turn, is given by the difference between revenues (R), 'taxes collected', and the costs (C) for obtaining these revenues (e.g., collection costs):
Revenues and costs are both functions of the size of the ruling clique (M) and the degree of obfuscation (O), that is, the degree to which the true purpose (income extraction) of a policy is hidden from the population:
'Obfuscation' in the present context simply means that different methods may be employed to extract a given income, some of which are more visible or transparent, while others are more opaque. (For example, direct confiscation of assets is highly visible, while taxes and tariffs
